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Title VII Ruling Underscores Need for Reform

With the Supreme Court’s most recent round of decisions, things look a little more grim for women – again.

By Priscilla Lazaro

In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire Co., an employee at Goodyear argued that she was unfairly discriminated against in performance evaluations, which caused her to miss pay raises in subsequent years. The court’s 5-4 ruling in favor of Goodyear, while legally sound, flies against the spirit of Title VII, which outlaws employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin. The decision highlights the need to revise portions of the Civil Rights Act, lest the persistent issues of pay inequality between the sexes continue.

Key to the decision is a provision in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which requires discrimination complaints to be filed within 180 days of the discriminatory action. Though Ledbetter didn’t file her complaint within 180 days of the performance evaluations she claimed were discriminatory (and eventually prevented her from getting a raise), she argued that every paycheck following the decision was the result of discriminatory action. Each check, she argued, counted as a violation of Title VII.

The court’s majority, however, held that only the allegedly discriminatory decision – the performance reviews – was legally actionable under Title VII. Since the discrimination claim was not filed within the 180-day reporting period, it was ruled invalid by the court.

The decision has disappointed equal-rights advocates the nation over, who view the ruling as a blow to would-be complainants.

Some continue to cite data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which reported that women earned an average of $600 per week in 2006, compared to an average of $743 a week for men. Though this ratio has increased in recent years – by this simple measure, women earn 80 percent of what men earn on average.

By itself, this direct comparison of wages is strictly apples-to-oranges. In general, women end up in lower-paying fields. For one, women hold only 30 percent of jobs with a median yearly income over $40,000. Additionally, women tend to value jobs that have perks other than high pay. The nonpartisan Center for Policy Alternatives found that 71 percent of women preferred jobs that offered flexibility and benefits rather than high wages.

Furthermore, women are more likely to leave the workforce at some time, either for childrearing, to take care of family members or to move to a new location with the rest of their family. As a result, women tend to have fewer years of experience and work fewer hours a year.

Comparing only median wages, much of the wage gap can be explained by a combination of these factors. Indeed, women begin their careers at near-parity with their male counterparts, taking in 96 percent of what men earn between the ages of 19 and 24.

Nonetheless, that small difference is significant. More importantly, an extensive 2003 General Accounting Office study of men and women in similar positions and with similar work patterns (including controls for marital status, race, number of children, hours worked and length of service) found that women still earn less than men over the course of their career.

The exact number of women who face workplace pay discrimination could be debated – and probably will be – until the cows come home. But whether the majority of women would even be affected by Title VII is beside the point. The purpose of civil rights legislation is to protect the basic rights of all people, be they in the majority or minority. Even if only a few women take advantage of Title VII, it is still be a necessary part of the American legal code.

As Title VII currently stands, the court made a legally sensible decision. Ruling in favor of Ledbetter could lead to the interpretation that discrimination can be proven without demonstrating discrimination. But as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said in her dissent, a decision in favor of Ledbetter would be “”more in tune with the realities of the workplace, and more respectful of Title VII’s remedial purpose.””

There are reasons, of course, why the 180-day limitation is helpful. Like any statute of limitations, it allows companies to operate without the fear of lawsuits from long ago.

But such a short period – 180 days from the time the pay decision was made – is unrealistic, especially for an issue dealing with pay. Businesses and governments are notoriously tight-lipped about employment matters; in fact, employment practices are usually exempt from freedom of information laws that can otherwise be used to pry information from unwilling sources. And employers may be especially recalcitrant if they suspect a pay discrimination lawsuit may be in the works.

Then there’s the issue of common courtesy. In most social circles, directly comparing your salary or wages with those of your peers is frowned upon. Nevermind 180 days – it is entirely possible that discriminatory pay practices may not be discovered until years after they are put in place.

Moreover, the 180-day statute of limitations may actually encourage wary employees to take unnecessary legal action. Instead of trying to iron out pay issues with company management, employees may immediately resort to legal action, fearful that their case will lose legal standing if they wait too long.

Employers shouldn’t operate under the shadow of lawsuits; but pay discrimination might not come to light immediately. A simple compromise is to extend the 180-day reporting period. Permitting complainants several years to discover and document discrimination would be far more practical, and would require only minimal changes to the Equal Rights Act. The right of employers to operate with a minimal threshold of certainty must of course be protected, but the defense of individual equality is far more important.

Besides, employers with fair compensation practices should have little to fear. And any other potential complainant should take note: Unlike the Equal Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 has no filing restrictions.

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